Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court In and For San Mateo County by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
3-26-1958
Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court In and
For San Mateo County
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court In and For San Mateo County 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/450
(S. F. No. 19841. In Bank. Mar. 26, 1958.] 
HENRY R. JAHN AND SON, INC. (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO 
COUNTY, Respondent; AMERICAN DRYING SYS-
TEMS, INC. (a Corporation), R.eal Party in Interest. 
[1] Process-Foreign Corporations-Service on Secretary of State. 
-An aftidavit for service of process against a foreign cor-
poration by personal service on the Secretary of State met 
the requirements of Corp. Code, § 6501, where existence of 
the required facts was alleged directly and without qualifi-
eation; the statute does not provide that the aftidavit cannot 
be made by plaintiff's attorney. 
[2] Oorporations-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process 
on foreign corporations that are doing business in this state, 
"doing business" is a descriptive term that the courts have 
equated with such minimum eontacts with the state that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and sub£tantial justice. 
[8] Id. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business. - "Doing bnsi-
ness" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411, is synony-
mons with the power of the state to subject foreign corpora-
tions to local proces~ . 
[4] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under the mini-
mum contacts test, purchase of goods by a foreign corpora-
tion within this state as a regular part of its business can 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 57(2); [2-4] Corporations, 
§ 898; [5-9] Corporations, § 900. 
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constitute doing business rendering it amenable to proeeB8 in" 
actions engendered by such activities. < 
[6] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-It is suf. 
ficient for purposes of due process that a suit against a foreign 
corporation be based on a contract that has substantial eon· 
nection with the state asserting jurisdiction; the presenoe 
theory of jurisdiction is not applicable. 
(6] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-The exer-
cise by a foreign corporation of the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state may give rise to obligations and, so far 
as those obligations arise out of or are connected with activi. 
ties within the state, a procedure requiring the corporation to 
respond to a suit brought to enforce them does not offend 
against the due process clause. 
[7] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Liability to Be Sued.-
Whenever litigation arises out of business transactions eon· 
ducted across state lines between parties whose principal 
places of business are in different states, there may be hard· 
ship to the party required to litigate away from home, but 
there is no constitutional requirement that this hardship must 
invariably be borne by plaintiff whenever defendant is not 
deemed present in the state of plaintiff's residence. 
[8a, 8b] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Liability to Be Sued. 
-A foreign corporation could be subject to the jurisdiction of 
California courts where it made regular purchases of goods 
through interstate communication from plaintiff as its exclusive 
export agent, took title to the goods in this state, directed its 
agent how and when to ship them, entered into a similar course 
of business dealings with defendant partnership, reaped the 
benefits of our laws that protected its goods while they were 
in the state and had access to the state courts to enforce any 
rights in regard to these transactions; though some of the 
evidence might be more readily available in New York, there, 
was other evidence already in California, the corporation's I 
burden of defending in California was no greater than plain-
tiff's burden of suing in New York, and a denial of jurisdic-
tion would lead only to a duplicity of litigation to determine 
the existence or nonexistence of a single tortious conspiracy. 
[9] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-Whether 
due process is satisfied in a suit against a foreign corporation 
must depend on the quality and nature of the activity in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which 
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of San Mateo County to set aside its order for substituted serv- I 
ice of process and to quash service of summons on petitioner. . 
Writ denied. 
) 
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Joseph C. Meyerstein and Donald J. Kennedy for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Pedder, Ferguson & Pedder and Robert J. Pedder for Real 
Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, Henry R. Jahn and Son, Inc., 
seeks a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County to set aside its order for substituted service of 
process and to quash service of summons on petitioner in an 
action brought by plainti1f, the real party in interest in this 
proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.8.) Dante J. Cac-
ciari and Alexander Columbo, individually and as copartners 
doing business as the C & C Company, were joined as defend-
ants in plainti1f's action. The superior court made an order 
allowing plainti1f to serve process on petitioner pursuant to 
section 6501 of the Corporations Code.· Thereafter petitioner 
appeared specially and moved to set aside the order for service 
of process and to quash the service of summons. These motions 
were denied. 
Plainti1f alleged in its complaint that it entered into a series 
of three-party contracts with Jahn and various distributors in 
South and Central America for the purpose of marketing 
grain driers in those areas. J ahn had the exclusive right to 
sell plainti1f's products, and the distributors agreed not to 
handle competing products. Pursuant to these contracts, 
J ahn purchased driers from plainti1f and resold them through 
the various distributors. Business was conducted accordingly 
for over two years. 
Defendants Cacciari and Columbo were associated with a 
company that manufactured driers for plainti1f according to 
secret plans and specifications supplied by plainti1f. They 
resigned from that company, taking plainti1f's plans and spe-
cifications with them. Thereafter they conspired with J ahn to 
-Section 6501 of the Corporations Code reads: "If the agent desig· 
Dated for the aemee of process be a natural person and e&Dnot be found 
with due diligence at the address atated in the designation or if IUeb 
agent be a corporation and no person e&D be found with due diligence 
to whom the delivery authorized by Seetion 6500 may be made for the 
purpoee of delivery to such corporate agent. or it the agent designated 
is no longer authorized to act, or it no agent has been designated and it 
no one of-the officers or agents of the corporation specified in Section 
6500 can be found after diligent search and it is so shown by affidavit to 
the satisfaction of the court or judge, then the court or judge may make 
all order that lervice be made by personal delivery to the Secretary of 
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take over plaintiff's business. Cacciari and Columbo formed a 
California partnership to manufacture and sell driers similar 
to plaintiff's driers, making use of plaintiff's plans and specifi-
cations. Jahn became the partnership's exclusive agent for 
exporting its driers. Jahn and the partners conspired to 
induce breaches of plaintiff's exclusiye contracts with distribu· 
tors, making use of confidential mailing lists and other data 
bearing on plaintiff's South and Central American business. 
Plaintiff prayed that defendants be enjoined from inducing 
breaches of its distributorship contracts, using plaintiff's con-
fidential mailing lists and other customer data, manufacturing 
and selling driers similar to plaintiff's driers, and using plain-
tiff's plans and specifications. It also prayed for an account-
ing of the business diverted by the foregoing activities, the 
appointment of a receiver, and exemplary damages. 
[1] There is no merit in Jahn's contention that the affi· 
davit for service on the Secretary of State did not meet the 
requirements of Corporations Code section 6501. The existence 
of the required facts was alleged directly and without quali. 
fication. (Of., Oolumbia Screw 00. v. 'Warner Lock Co., 138 
Cal. 445, 447 [71 P. 498].) The statute does not provide 
that the affidavit cannot be made by the plaintiff's attorney. 
Jahn further contends that it was not and is not doing 
business in this state within the meaning of Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 411, subdivision 2, and is therefore not 
subject to service of process pursuant to Corporations Code 
section 6501. 
[S] The statute authorizes service of process on foreign 
corporations that are "doing business in this State." That 
term is a descriptive one that the courts have equated with 
such minimum contacts with the state "that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.''' (International Shoe Co. v. Wash. 
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 
1057].) Whatever limitation it imposes is equivalent to that 
of the due process clause. [3] '" [D]oing business' within 
the meaning of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is 
synonymous with the power of the state to subject foreign 
corporations to local process. " (Eclipse Fuel etc. Co. v. Supe-
State or to an assistant or deputy secretary of state of two copies of the 
process together with two copies of the order, except thnt if the corpora· 
tion to be lIerved has not filed the statement required to be filed b,. 
Section 6403 then only one copy of the process and order need be deliv-
ered but the order shan include and Bet forth an address to which such 
proeeaa shall be lent b7 the Secretary of State." 
) 
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rior Oourt, 148 Cal.App.2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] ; see also 
Gray v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 155 Cal.App.2d 55, 58 
[317 P.2d 114]; McOlanahan v. Trans-America Ins. 00., 149 
Cal.App.2d 171, 172 [307 P.2d 1023] ; Jeter v. Austin Trailer 
Equipment 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 376, 387 [265 P.2d 130]: 
Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, Inc., 118 Cal.App. 
2d 211, 218-224 [257 P.2d 727J, and cases cited; LeVecke v. 
Griesedieck Western Brewing 00., 233 F.2d 772, 775; Kenny 
v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F.Supp. 838,850.) 
[4] Jahn's purchase of goods in this state is a regular part 
of its business. It nevertheless contends that it is not amen-
able to suit here, invoking Rosenberg Bros. tJ 00. v. Curtis 
Brown 00., 260 U.S. 516 [43 S.Ct. 170, 67 L.Ed. 372]. The 
United States Supreme Court, however, has advanced beyond 
the presence theory of jurisdiction underlying that ease. 
(McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78 
S.Ct. 199, 200, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] ; see also International 8hoe 
00. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316~317 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90 
L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Under the minimum contacts 
test of the International Shoe case regular sales solicitation 
alone can constitute doing business rendering the foreign cor-
poration amenable to process in actions engendered by such 
activities. (See TratJelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 
643, 648-649 [70 S.Ct. 927. 94 L.Ed. 11541; Nippert v. Ricl!-
mond, 327 U.S. 416. 426 [66 S.Ot. 586, 90 L.Ed. 760. 162 
A.IJ.R. 844J ; Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115. 
119; Frene v. L01lisville Oement 00., 77 App.D.C. 129 [134 
F.2d 511, 515-517, 146 A.L.R. 926] ; Jeter v. Austi1l Trailer 
Equipment 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 376, 385 [265 P.2d 130]; 
Kont:nklijke L. M. v. Superior Oourt, 107 Cal.App.2d 495, 500 
[237 P.2d 297J.) Since there is no distinction for jurisdic· 
tional purposes between regular selling and regular buying 
(Sterling Novelty Oorp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distributing 00., 
299 N.Y. 208. 210 fR6 N.E.2d 564] : Star Elkhor1l Coal 00. v. 
Red Ash Pocahontas Ooal 00., 102 F.Supp. 258. 259), the 
Rosenberg ease is as obsolete for the one as for the other. 
Many cases antt'('eding the Rosenberg case and many since the 
International Shot' case have sustained jurisdiction on the 
basis of the deft'ndant's purchasing activities in the state. 
<Colorado 11'011. Works v. Sierra Grande Min. 00., 15 Colo. 
499 [25 P. 325. 327-328.22 Am.St.Rep. 433] ; Premo Specialty 
Mfg. 00. v. Jef' .. ~ey-Oreme Co., 118 O.C.A. 458 [200 F. 352. 356. 
43 L.R.A.N.S. 1015]: D1tr1gan, Hood & 00. v. C. F. Bally. 
Limited, 271 F. 517, 519; Payne & Joubert v. East Unw1I 
) 
) 
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Lumber Co., 109 La. 706 [33 So. 739, 740.741] ; Duluth Log 
Co. v. Pulpwood Co., 187 Minn. 812 [163 N.W. 520, 521]; 
Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank cf Hirsch Distributing Co., 
299 N.Y. 208, 212 [86 N.E.2d 564J: National Furniture Co. v. 
Wm. Sruigelma'1l cf Co., 198 App.Div. 672 [190 N.Y.S. 831. 
832] : Scheier v. Stoff, 142 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717; Star Elkhorfl 
Coal Co. v. Bed Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102 F.Supp. 258, 
259; see also Johnson v. Atlantic cf Pacific Fisheries Co., 128 
Wash. 578 [224 P. 13, 14].) 
The Supreme Court has emphasized its departure from 
the presence test by the significance it now attaches to the 
fact that the cause of action arises out of the defendant's 
contacts with the state asserting jurisdiction. The Rosenberg 
case deemed it immaterial that the cause of action arose out 
of the corporation's New York activities, on the ground that 
its total activities there did not support the conclusion that 
it was present. [5] Now, however, it "issufticient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract 
which had substantial connection with . . . [the J State. " 
(McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78 
S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223].) [6] "But to the extent 
that a corporation exercises the privilege of condncting activi· 
ties within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the 
laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give 
rise to obligations, and, 80 far as those obligations arise out 
of 9r are connected with the activities within the state, 8 
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to 8 
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances. hardly bE' 
said to be undue." (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. 161 A.L.R. 
1057].) 
[7] Whenever litigation arises out of business transactions 
conducted across state lines between parties whose principal 
places of business are in different states, there may be hardship 
to the party required to litigate away from home. There is 
DO constitutional requirement, however. that this hardship 
must invariably be borne by the plaintiff whenever the defend· 
ant is. not deemed present in the state of plaintiff's residence. 
In some circumstances there is adequate basis for jurisdiction 
when the .defendant has ele(lted to dea] with the plaintiff 
even though only by mail. (McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78 S.Ct. 199. 201. 2 L.Ed.2d 2231 : Parma· 
lee v. Iowa State TraveUflg Mefl's AssfI .. 206 F.2d 518, 522.) 
Again, there is jurisdiction when the cause of action arose 
) 
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out of the breach of a contract made and to be performed in 
the state (Campania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 
205 Md. 237 [107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372, 49 A.L.R.2d 646], 
cert. den., 348 U.S. 943 r75 S.Ct. 365, 99 L.Ed. 7881 ; see also 
S. Howes Co. v. W. P Milling Co., -- Okla. -- [277 P.2d 
655, 657-658]) or even out of a mere isolated act in the state 
by the defendant or his agent. (Nelso11 v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 
378 [143 N.E.2d 673]; Smyth v. Twin State ImprOfJeme11t 
Corp., 116 Vt. 569 [80 A.2d 664. 25 A.L.R.2d 11931: Hess v 
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 [47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Johns v. 
Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 654.) 
[8aJ We need not here determinl' whether an action arising 
from an isolated purchase of goods 'here through interstatf' 
communication would subject Jahn to the jurisdiction of thf' 
California courts. Jahn made regular purchases from plain-
tiff as its exclusive export agent. It took title to the goodR 
in this state. It directed its agent how and where to ship them 
Even after it ceased doing business with plaintiff, it entered 
into a similar course of business dealings with defendant 
partnership. It reaped the benefits of our laws that protected 
its goods while they were here, and it had access to our courtR 
to enforce any rights in regard to these transactions. The 
alleged cause of action grew directly out of Jahn's relation-
ship with plaintiff and the partnership in this state. (See 
Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, 156 F.2d 351, 354; Steiner v. 
20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 198: De Golia v. 
Twentieth Centu'1/-Fox Films Corp., 140 F.Supp. 316.) Al-
though some of the evidence may be more readily available 
in New York, there is other evidence already here. That which 
must be secured from overseas can as easily be presented here 
as in New York. The inconvenience to Jahn in defend-
ing here is relevant (lnternatio11.al Shoe Co. v. Wn..'1h.ingtoft. 
326 U.S. 310, 317 r66 s.Ct. 154. 90 L.Ed. 95. 161 A.L.R. 
1057] ). but "Looking back over this long history of litigation 
It trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissiblp 
'!cope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other 
nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental 
transformation of our national economy over the years Today 
many commercial transactions touch two or more States and 
may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this 
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great in-
creal'll' in the amount of business conducted by mail across 
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and 
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party 
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sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic 
activity." (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 
220 [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223].) It also bears 
emphasis that if plaintiff were unable to bring an action 
against J ahn here, it would be similarly frustrated with 
regard to Jahn's codefendants in New York. Two actions 
instead of one would then be necessary to litigate the existence 
or nonexistence of a single tortious conspiracy. 
[9] "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark 
the boundary line between those activities which justify the 
subjection of a corporation to suit. and those which do not, 
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not 
merely, as has sometimes been suggested. whether the activity, 
which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its 
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. 
[Citations. ) Whether due process is satisfied must depend 
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation 
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it 
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." (Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Wa.,hington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct. 
154.90 L.Ed. 95. 16] A.L.R. 1057].) 
[8b] Jahn's burden of defending here is no greater than 
plaintiff's burden of suing in New York. The cause of action 
is directly related to J ahn 's dealings with the California 
plaintiff and the California defendants. A denial of juris-
diction would lead only to a duplicity of litigation. "[Tlhe 
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws" fully justifies subjecting 
.1 ahn to th£' jurisdiction of our courts. 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J _, Shenk, J., Carter, J'J and Spence, J., eon-
curred. 
McComb, J .. dissented. 
SCHAUER. J., Dissenting.-From th£' record in this ease 
the following facts appear: Petitioner has at no time main-
tained any offices in California. or made any sales or sales 
solicitations here.' It is the ex('IU!;ive export agent for Ameri· 
can Drying Systems. Inc. (real party in interest). and also 
the agent for one other California mannf8('turer. Petitioner 
places its orders for purchase of the products of these two 
manufacturers by mail or telephone from New York, and. 
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although the course of purchases is regular. nO purchase orders 
are placed from California. The goods are shipped f.o.b, 
,California, .are . packaged for shipping in California, and 
are shipped by the manufacturers to a general forwaTdfug' 
company in California. The forwarding company is selected 
by petitioner, al!d receives its shipping instructions directly 
from petitioner. On two occasions, when the orders were 
rather large, petitioner sent one of its auditors to California 
with the check for payment. and he ascertained that the order 
was properly filled before making payment. Petitioner has 
apparently had no contacts with California other than those 
just mentioned. 
In the light of the basic facts it appears that in holding 
that petitioner was U doing business in this State" 80 88 to 
subject it to service of process pursuant to section 6501 of the 
Corporations Code, the majority opinion indicates a trend 
toward, if not implicitly an actual, holding that all ·persons 
residing and doing business outside California but who place 
orders by telephone or correspondence for goods in this state 
and who arrange (as they must, if the orders are to be filled) 
for packing, shipping and delivery of the goods 80 purchased, 
will thereby become subject to the jurisdi~tion of California 
courts and subject to suit in this state, Such a holding seem!" 
especially unfortunate and undesirable. particularly for the 
manufacturers and producers of California. as it must inevita· 
bly tend to deter those who are in the market for California 
products from sending to this state for them. It is a matter 
of common knowledge that efforts are coustantly being made 
by the various states on both a governmental and a private 
industry level to attract additional industry and commerce. 
and . I believe that where, as here, the law is at least equally 
open to a contrary ruling, the court should not choose the 
course which will be detrimental to the interests of California. 
I 'would grant the peremptory wri~ 
